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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The present study examines the role of disclosure in assisting market 
participants to form expectations of future earnings by observing the accrual content 
of reported earnings. Previous research (Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Gelb and 
Zarowin, 2002; Hope, Kang, Thomas and Vasvari, 2008; Ettredge, Kwon, Smith and 
Zarowin, 2005) has shown that disclosure enhances the degree at which future 
earnings information is reflected in current stock returns. Other studies which also 
examine future earnings information in current returns consider the impact of various 
reported accounting numbers and practices and financial decisions (e.g. dividends by 
Hanlon, Myers and Shevlin, 2007 and Walker and Hussainey, 20081, R&D 
expenditures by Oswald and Zarowin, 2007; income smoothing practices by Tucker 
and Zarowin, 2006).  To the extent that reported accounting numbers and practices are 
assessed with respect to their ability to provide relevant information without taking 
into account disclosure, conclusions can be drawn on the effect of these numbers and 
practices at the average level of disclosure only. Here, we show that these conclusions 
can be significantly altered at varying levels of disclosure.   
 Our study adds to this literature by examining whether the information about 
future earnings in current returns is conditional upon disclosure, the degree at which 
                                                 
1  Similarly to the present study Walker and Hussainey (2008) examine the impact of cash dividends on 
share price anticipation of future earnings conditionally upon a measure of disclosure. However, while 
the authors examine the impact of a financial decision, we focus on accounting numbers.  
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accounting numbers reveal useful information to outside investors and their 
interactions. In this context, we acknowledge the usefulness of accrual accounting to 
convey estimates of future cash flows. Christensen and Demski (2003, chapter 17), 
point out that these two features of financial reporting (accruals and disclosure) 
should not be considered separately. In this vein, Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) 
point out that investors condition their investment decisions upon disclosure and 
conservative or aggressive accounting policies.2  Instead of accounting policies, the 
present study focuses on the nature of accruals and the complementary role of 
disclosure in revealing their relevance and reliability for the prediction of future 
earnings and cash-flows. Pope (2003) points out that there are two primary 
dimensions of accounting systems that affect the predictability of earnings, holding 
economic uncertainty constant: (1) accruals measurement rules and (2) the degree of 
disclosure of accruals procedures. They both enhance or reduce the predictability of 
earnings and their components.  The present study contributes by providing empirical 
evidence on the interplay between disclosure and different timing and dimensions of 
accruals in assisting market participants to anticipate future earnings.   
 Motivated by Christensen and Demski (2003) who point out that different 
dimensions and timing of accruals alter the information that is being conveyed, this 
study contributes by investigating the influence of the nature of accruals on the 
association between information on future earnings in current returns and disclosure. 
The emphasis is on clarifying the distinction between the roles of current and non-
current accruals, with current accruals addressing more matching and timing issues 
than non-current accruals. Therefore, the present study aims to shed light on the role 
of disclosure in assisting market participants in forming expectations of future 
                                                 
2 In a related study, Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) find out that different combinations of the 
aggressive-conservative accounting as suggested by the use of discretionary accruals affect the impact 
of disclosure on the cost of equity capital. 
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earnings by observing accruals when the information provided by accruals has 
different timeliness.  
 An important part of accounting research has investigated accruals as a means 
of improving relevance, usefulness and quality of financial statement information 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Shipper, 2005)3 and even 
firms’ overall information quality (Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson and Schipper, 2006). 
On the other hand, more recent studies by Core, Guay and Verdi (2007), Hribar and 
Nichols (2007), Liu and Wysocki (2007) and Wysocki (2007) document evidence 
which challenges the ability of accruals to reflect firm’s earnings quality. Following 
Lev, Li and Sougiannis (2005) we maintain that the extensive use of accruals as a 
means of improving the relevance of financial information may be jeopardized by the 
increasing difficulty of making reliable forecasts in a fast-changing economy, and also 
by the frequent managerial misuse of estimates to manipulate financial data.   
 In this study, we acknowledge the importance of considering the 
complementary role of disclosure for the interpretation of accruals when these 
accruals are either misguided or manipulated. We argue that adequate disclosure is 
necessary for market participants not only to enhance the timeliness of information 
contained in accruals but also to assess the reliability of the future earnings cash-flows 
expectations arising from these accruals. In other words, the present study also 
investigates the ability of disclosure to have a further corrective influence by 
preventing the formation of over-optimistic/pessimistic earnings expectations 
associated with the use of accruals.  
 A final unique feature of the present study that is of interest is that it applies a 
uniform measure of disclosure on a number of firms originating from various 
                                                 
3 Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) use the relation 
between a firm’s cash flow and working capital accruals to measure earnings quality.  
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European jurisdictions. The specific measure of disclosure being developed within a 
high outsider investor protection jurisdiction is particularly suitable for assessing the 
usefulness of disclosure across jurisdictions whose financial reporting practices do not 
necessarily focus on outsiders but also where there is an increasing demand from 
outsiders. Even though this exercise is conducted in a pre-IFRS period (2001-2003), 
the findings are particularly relevant and timely in a post-IFRS period as the financial 
reporting still appears to be influenced by local institutional features (see for example, 
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2008) despite the uniform disclosure benchmark 
provided by the IFRS and its focus on the outside market participants.  
 The remainder of our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 develops the 
arguments on how accruals and disclosure affect market participants’ expectations of 
future earnings. Section 3 discusses the disclosure metric employed here. Section 4 
presents the data employed in the study. Section 5 discusses the methodology and the 
related empirical results and section 6 concludes the study.  
                   
2. ACCRUALS, DISCLOSURE AND THE SHARE PRICE ANTICIPATION 
OF EARNINGS 
 
 The examination of share price anticipation of future earnings begins with 
Collins et al. (1994) who attribute the low association between returns and 
contemporaneous earnings to the lack of timeliness in accounting earnings4 in 
measuring value relevant events. By adding future earnings in the regression of 
current returns to current earnings, they find that returns contain information on future 
                                                 
4 The (lack of) timeliness and asymmetric timeliness of accounting earnings has been investigated in 
detail by numerous studies in empirical financial accounting literature (e.g., Basu, 1997; Pope and 
Walker 1999) either in an international context considering a set of different institutional arrangements 
(e.g., Ball et al., 2001; Giner and Rees, 2001; Ball et al., 2003; Dargenidou et al. 2007) or considering a 
set of firm level characteristics including disclosure (e.g., Barth et al., 2008; Garcia Lara, 2005, Raonic 
et al. 2004) or as an important attribute of accounting earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004). 
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earnings; the future earnings response coefficient (FERC) in this context “catches up” 
with the information given out by current earnings and other sources of current 
information about expected future earnings (alternatively, it can be said that  FERC 
captures the share price anticipation of earnings).5   
 In this study, we address accruals as the tools employed by accounting to 
communicate information about future cash flows and future earnings. Pope (2003) 
argues that accruals based on the realization and matching principles reduce the 
variance of earnings relative to cash flows and create more permanent, predictable 
earnings components. Evidence in Dechow (1994) suggests that the increased use of 
accruals enhances the role of earnings as a measure of short-term performance which 
better reflects expected cash flows, and particularly so with regards to working capital 
accruals relative to non-current operating accruals6. Working capital accruals in 
particular,  are seen to be more successful in mitigating matching and timing problems 
than long-term accruals, an evidence that is confirmed also by Guay and Sidhu 
(2001). More to the point, Guay and Sidhu (2001) argue that non-current accruals do 
reduce timing and matching problems in much the same way as current accruals while 
non-current  accruals resolve timing and matching problems in cash flows over longer 
intervals. As longer intervals imply a slower pace and higher uncertainty in 
establishing the economic benefits (or losses) associated with these accruals, it is 
expected that current accruals demonstrate greater contribution in incorporating 
information on future earnings into current prices compared to non-current accruals. 
                                                 
5 Collins et al. (1994) argue that using the actual future earnings introduces an error in variables 
problem in the regression of current returns on current earnings and future earnings  as the theoretically 
correct regressor is the unobservable expected future earnings. This measurement error problem biases 
downward estimates of the future earnings coefficients. Collins et al. (1994) address this problem by 
including the future return as a control variable.  
6 Dechow (1994) examines the association between current earnings with returns across quintiles of 
operating accruals which are decomposed into their working capital and long-term components.  
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 However, both Dechow (1994) and Guay and Sidhu (2001) do not take into 
account the conservative nature of accounting. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and  
Dechow and Ge (2006) show that accruals are likely to provide more timely 
information in the case of  loss of future economic benefits, with negative non-current 
accruals being especially relevant in this respect (e.g. restructuring charges, goodwill 
impairments, and asset write-downs). Therefore, it is also argued that information on 
future earnings in current returns is likely to be more pronounced for negative than for 
positive accruals and especially, with respect to negative non-current accruals as 
opposed to positive non-current accruals since information in negative accruals is 
likely to resolve more timing issues.  
 Until this point, accruals have been considered as means of communicating 
information on future earnings and cash flows. However, as extensive literature on 
earnings management suggests, accruals can be also guided by managements’ 
discretion. Managers may manage earnings through accruals either for opportunistic 
reasons or for communicating a sustainable level of future earnings. Furthermore, 
managers simply may face increasing difficulty of making reliable forecasts in a fast-
changing economy (Lev, Li  and Sougiannis, 2005).  Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and 
Tuna (2005) take a more comprehensive perspective of accruals documenting that less 
reliable categories of accruals lead to lower earnings persistence and that investors do 
not fully anticipate the lower earnings persistence. Hirscheifer, Hou, Teoh and Zhang 
(2004) find that firms with “bloated balance sheets”, i.e. firms with high net operating 
assets, have high and growing earnings prior to the conditioning date, but declining 
earnings subsequent to that date. More importantly, they argue that investors fail to 
predict future lower earnings and tend to overvalue such firms.  Here, we argue that 
the extreme magnitudes of accruals are more prone to hide extensive use of unreliable 
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accruals and hence, more likely to guide over- optimistic/pessimistic future earnings 
expectations. Due to timing effects, we also argue that this is more likely to happen 
with respect to current accruals rather non-accruals whose future economic benefits 
potentially take longer to realise in future earnings. However, again due to the timing 
effects, this also could happen in the cases where managers employ very conservative 
accounting accelerating the recognition of losses of future economic benefits (as in 
Dechow and Ge, 2006). 
 However, market participants do not use solely accounting numbers to predict 
future earnings but also a number of other sources of qualitative information. Here it 
is argued that assessing the impact of accounting practices on the share price 
anticipation of earnings without taking into account other sources of information that 
also shape returns i.e., disclosure, will produce an estimate of this impact at the 
average level of disclosure. Such a generalisation will not hold for all firms and might 
lead to erroneous conclusions on the efficiency of a particular accounting practice to 
communicate relevant information. For instance, Oswald and Zarowin (2007) find 
that capitalization of R&D is associated with higher FERC relative to expensing. Such 
result is consistent with the capitalisation decision sending a more reliable signal of 
future economic benefits arising from this asset. However, while this result holds 
under an average level of disclosure, it is unclear whether the investors would still 
attribute a higher FERC to recognised R&D as opposed to expensed R&D if the 
capitalisation decision had not been sufficiently explained to market participants and 
the associated future economic benefits could not be assessed by outsider investors. 
Therefore, it is also argued here that in order to have a better understanding of the 
impact of accounting practices on market participants’ expectations, we also need to 
consider incremental and interactive effects of the varying levels of disclosure. 
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 In the present study, we argue that increased disclosure may assist in 
unravelling the future cash flow and earnings implications of accruals and thus 
mitigate the over-pessimistic/optimistic earnings expectations arising from unreliable 
accruals. Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2006) report that disclosure affects the 
distribution of future cash flow estimates. Futhermore, Hope (2003) documents that 
firm’s disclosure is useful in reducing uncertainty about future earnings and especially 
so in circumstances where alternative mechanisms are not available to improve the 
transparency of accounting numbers. These perspectives point out to both roles of 
disclosure, to reveal future cash flow estimates and to enhance the reliability of 
accounting numbers. It is argued here that where accounting information is not 
reliable, disclosure will prevent this information to affect future earnings expectations.  
There is only limited and quite recent evidence in this respect; for instance, Louis, 
Robinson and Sbaraglia(2008) and  Drake, Myers and Myers (2006) find that accruals 
related mispricing does not take place among firms with adequate and high disclosure.  
 The implications of increased disclosure for future earnings predictability have 
been investigated by Gelb and Zarowin (2002), Lundholm and Myers (2002) who 
show that better and more informative disclosure introduces more information on 
future earnings in current returns. This finding points out to the incremental effects of 
disclosure for revealing future earnings and cash flows, consistent with Lambert, Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2006). However, the evidence in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and 
Lundholm and Myers (2002) could erroneously lead us to believe that more disclosure 
will inadvertently increase information on future earnings in current returns. Those 
studies do not acknowledge that earnings already contain components that inform 
market participants on future earnings and cash flows that is, accruals. Here we argue 
that accruals and disclosure also interact with each other with disclosure enhancing 
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the reliability of the information in accruals. When earnings manipulation 
intentionally triggers over/under-statement of future earnings expectations in current 
stock prices, corporate disclosure has the ability to reveal information that can be used 
by outside investors to curb the over/under-statement and adjust their expectations 
compounded in the current stock price accordingly. Based on the literature reviewed 
here, it is expected that disclosure can curb an over/under-prediction of future 
earnings in the case of high absolute accruals and especially where these accruals 
resolve short term timing issues via current accruals or negative non-current accruals 
(e.g., restructuring charges, goodwill impairments, and asset write-downs). However, 
when the information in accruals resolves timing issues over a longer horizon which 
implies a slower pace and higher uncertainty in establishing the associated economic 
benefits (or losses) associated with these accruals, disclosure may not further enhance 
information on future earnings.   
 
3. MEASUREMENT OF DISCLOSURE 
 
 Measuring corporate disclosure activities is not an easy task. Disclosures are 
often qualitative in nature which makes it difficult for empirical researches to 
objectively identify most important aspects of disclosure quality. Some authors 
construct their own disclosure matrices (Lee, Shen and Petroni 2006; Barton and 
Waymire 2004; Hail, 2002; Botosan 1997). Research-made scores are usually limited 
to a few financial reporting characteristics which rely on the researcher’s judgment 
and are costly to implement. Studies that investigate effect of disclosure in an 
international context (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2004, Hope 2003, Chang, 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000) typically use the Centre for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (CIFAR) index constructed by examining annuals reports for 
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the omission or inclusion of 90 accounting items. There are studies that include other 
forms of voluntary disclosure activities such as conference calls with analysts that 
may either complement or substitute for financial reporting by reveling useful 
information to outside market participants (e.g., Frankel, Johnson and Skinner; 1999; 
Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller, 2003).  There are papers that rely on financial 
analysts ratings of disclosure (Daske and Gebhardt 2006; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 
1999, Lang and Lundholm 1996) including prior studies in the area more relevant to 
the present paper (Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002). They argue 
that analysts’ scores measure the usefulness of corporate disclosure as perceived by 
expert users of the information. However, these rankings are typically available for 
large (mostly U.S.) firms and reflect analysts’ subjective assessment of disclosure.  
 In the present paper, we choose Standard and Poor’s disclosure rankings 
created by examining firms’ annual reports across 98 dimensions. The advantage of 
this approach is that, unlike analysts’ subjective evaluation of disclosure, rankings are 
constructed using an objective assessment of corporate disclosure practices against a 
global benchmark7 (Khanna, Palepu, Srinivasan, 2004). The Standard and Poor’s 
rankings cover three broad categories: Financial Transparency and Information 
Disclosure, Board and Management Structure and Process and Ownership Structure 
and Investor Relations. One important feature of the rankings is that they assess 
whether a particular accounting dimension or investor protection mechanism is 
transparently disclosed rather than judging the quality of disclosure or whether a 
particular investor protection mechanism is adequate. Another important feature of 
the disclosure items used for the construction of the rankings is that they do not 
                                                 
7 Khanna, Palepu and Srinivasan (2004) point out that the large majority of 98 questions used for the 
scoring by Standard and Poor’s are actually based on either mandatory disclosures in the U.S. or on the 
perceived best practices in U.S. corporate disclosure. 
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discriminate between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. For example, they include 
information on the quality of accounting standards used for preparing annual reports 
as well as the information on management analysis and forecasts (investment plans, 
earnings forecasts, industry trends, etc.). Whilst it is difficult to quantify the latter 
type of information (e.g., related to management earnings forecasts) they are very 
useful in revealing qualitative and contextual information to outside investors 
enabling them to evaluate future viability of the company.  Hence, such disclosure 
events are likely to play an important part in assisting market participants in their 
attempts to interpret accruals and develop expectations of future earnings.  
 
4. DATA 
 
 The definition of accruals employed here builds on the approach by 
Richardson et al. (2005) and Fairfield, Whisenant and Yohn (2003) who define 
accruals as all assets and liabilities on the balance sheet except cash assets. Their 
definition of accruals includes the change in non-cash working capital, the change in 
non-current operating assets and liabilities and the change in non-cash financial assets 
and liabilities: 
Accruals = ΔCO + ΔNCO + ΔNFA     (1) 
where ΔCO is the change in net non-cash current operating assets; ΔNCO  is the 
change in net non-current operating assets;8 ΔNFA  is the change in net non-cash 
financial assets. 
                                                 
8 ΔNCO  is the change in net non current operating assets NCOt – NCOt-1, where NCO is given as non-
current operating assets (NCOA) – Non-current operating liabilities (NCOL). NCOA, non-current 
operating assets equal  total assets minus current assets minus long term other non operating 
investments; NCOL, non-current operating liabilities equal  total liabilities minus current liabilities 
minus long term debt excluding capitalized leases. ΔCO, the change in current accruals is defined as 
COt – COt-1. CO is calculated as current operating assets (COA) minus current operating liabilities 
(COL) where current operating assets equal current assets minus cash and short term investments; 
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 As the ability to generate profits is mainly driven by operating items, the study 
focuses on operating accruals ΔΝΟΑ, specified as the change in net non cash 
operating assets, as follows:  
ΔΝΟΑ = ΔCO + ΔΝCO      (2) 
 The Standard and Poor’s Financial Transparency and Disclosure survey 
(2002) on 17 European countries provides an initial sample of 348 firms; 76 out of 
348 firms are excluded because they are classified as financials (banking, investment, 
insurance). Further filters have also been applied when accounting and financial data 
were not available and finally, after the application of a Hadi (1994) procedure for the 
detection of outliers, the study is based on a sample of 283 firms and 683 observations 
for the period 2000-2002, that is, around the S&P rating period which included 
reports published in 2001 and 2002, depending on the fiscal year-end month. A 
survey conducted by Graham, Campbell and Rajgopal (2005) shows that managers 
are likely to avoid setting a precedent in disclosure that is difficult to maintain. 
Consistently, here it is assumed that disclosure levels are not likely to change 
dramatically from year to year.  
   The annual financial statement data source is Worldscope and Datastream for 
stock returns and market capitalization. Earnings are defined as net income before 
extraordinary items available to common shareholders, collected at accounting year-
end dates. As a measure of firm-level disclosure practices, we use the scores 
constructed in the S&P survey which focuses on a wide range of attributes and their 
coverage in key public documents released by companies. These attributes are 
grouped into three broad categories, concerning: (a) ownership structures and investor 
                                                                                                                                            
current operating liabilities equal current liabilities minus short term debt and current portion of long 
term-debt . 
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rights, (b) financial transparency and (c) board and management structure and 
process. These are further broken down into twelve sub-categories, and cover seventy 
two different topics in total. A score of 1 is assigned to a firm for each attribute 
disclosed in the annual report and 0 if otherwise. 
 The fiscal year-end restriction is not applied, and therefore companies are 
included that have reporting periods other than for the calendar year, together with 
those companies that changed the reporting-year end one or more times during the 
period.  The observed stock price dates are matched to three months after the 
corresponding accounting year-ends and the return figures annualized to a standard 
52-week-year accordingly.  
 Table 1 reports summary statistics for the study’s sample. Panel A reports the 
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables employed 
in the study, and Panel B reports the correlations. It can been seen that  more 
disclosure is associated with more non-current accruals and the opposite with respect 
to current accruals supporting the managers’ attempts to provide more reliability in 
the recognition of non-current accruals.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
(i) Effects of disclosure on the share price anticipation of earnings and cash flows 
 
In this section we develop empirical models which attempt to examine the 
interplay between levels of corporate disclosure and different dimensions of accruals 
in the context of anticipation of future earnings in current returns.   
The empirical approach here is based on a multiple regression model proposed 
by Collins et al. (1994) and further employed  in Lundholm and Myers (2002) and in 
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Walker and Hussainey (2008) to investigate the differential influence of disclosure 
level on the association between contemporaneous returns and future earnings: 
 
 
(3) 
 
where t,iR  is stock return of the i
th firm for year t measured over 12 month period 
ending three months after the fiscal year end, t,iX  is earnings before extraordinary 
items in year t scaled by the market capitalization of three months after the year t-1 
fiscal year end, and DISi is the Standard and Poor’s Financial Transparency and 
Disclosure Score of firm i. It could be argued that controls for size, a proxy for the 
firm’s visibility, and analysts’ following, a proxy for the influence of information 
intermediaries, could be added furthermore to the regression. However, given that the 
firms included in the S&P survey are large and highly visible in the European market, 
it is assumed that there is no variation in visibility and the influence of information 
intermediaries to be accounted for. On the other hand, all regressions in the current 
study include a control for country effects that is employed here to proxy for cross-
jurisdiction differences in institutional arrangements. 
 The coefficients on Xt-1 and Xt are expected to be negative and positive 
respectively, reflecting the mean-reverting nature of earnings which is consistent with 
prior literature (Collins et al., 1994). Collins et al. (1994) argue that using the actual 
future earnings introduces an error in variables problem in the regression of current 
returns on current earnings and future earnings as the theoretically correct regressor is 
the unobservable expected future earnings. This measurement error problem biases 
downward estimates of the future earnings coefficients. Collins et al. (1994) address 
this problem by including future share price returns Ri,t+1 as a control variable, whose  
ti,1ti,41ti,3ti,21ti,10ti, uRαXαXαXααR +++++= ++−
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coefficient is expected to be negative. The coefficient on Xt+1 is the future earnings 
response coefficient (FERC) that captures the share price anticipation of earnings in 
terms of the association between current stock returns Ri,t and future earnings Xi,t+1;  
its magnitude indicates the amount of information about future earnings contained in 
current stock returns. The coefficient on DIS*Xt+1 measures the extent to which price 
anticipation of future earnings is greater for high disclosers. The results from 
regression (3) reported in Model 1 in Table 2 suggest that current returns appear to be 
strongly associated with current earnings (coefficient on Xt is 1.348, p-value<0.01) 
and at a lesser degree with future earnings (the coefficient on Xt+1 is 0.2077 with a p-
value=0.03) for firms with a minimum disclosure. On the other hand, the negative and 
significant interaction coefficient DIS*Xt (-0.1278, p-value<0.01) suggests that the 
relevance of current earnings declines as disclosure activity reveals more future 
earnings news9. Also, the positive coefficient on DIS*Xt+1 (0.0766, p-value<0.01) 
suggests that disclosure reveals value relevant information that enhances the 
association between current returns and future earnings. These findings are in line 
with the prior evidence documented by Gelb and Zarowin (2002), Lundholm and 
Myers (2001) and Hussainey and Walker (2008). 
Following Tucker and Zarowin(2006), the study also provides evidence with 
the respect to the anticipation of future cash flows and examines the share price 
anticipation of future earning cash flow components and their interactions with 
disclosure. Future earnings Xt+1 are decomposed into its accrual and cash components 
as follows:   
 
 
                                                 
9 This finding is consistent with the theoretical proposal by Francis, Shipper and Vincent (1999) and by 
Lundholm and Myers (2002); however, the latter study fails to provide corresponding empirical 
evidence to support it.  
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 (4) 
where AXt+1 is the accrual component of future earnings Xt+1 and CFXt+1 is the cash 
flow component of future earnings.  The coefficients of our interest here are CFXt+1 
and DIS*CFXt+1. If good disclosure activities assist stock market in anticipating 
future cash flows we expect to see a positive coefficient on DIS*CFXt+1. The results 
from regression (4) are reported in Model 2 in Table 2. The findings suggest that 
under minimum disclosure, there are no cash-flow effects (coefficient on CFXt+1 is 
0.1539, p-value=0.1).  On the other hand, the coefficient on DIS*CFXt+1 is 
significantly positive (0.0825 with a p-value<0.01) suggesting that disclosure 
improves stock market anticipation of cash flow components of future earnings.  
 
(ii)Effects of disclosure and accruals on the price anticipation of earnings  
 
The focus of our empirical analysis is to investigate the extent at which 
accrual estimates made in current financial statements contribute to the price 
anticipation of earnings in terms of the amount of information they reveal about future 
earnings expectations. Moreover, in our empirical approach we emphasise the 
importance of giving consideration to different accruals’ dimensions in terms of their 
nature (current and non-current), their magnitude and their sign (positive and 
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negative).  Also, we observe the interplay between levels of corporate disclosure and 
accruals dimensions in the context of the price anticipation of earnings.  
In this respect, we develop a measure of accrual accounting defined as the 
decile rankings of sample observations based on the absolute value of different 
category of accruals at time t (as set in Section 4, current operating accruals and non-
current operating accruals), where observations with the highest (lowest) 10% of 
absolute values of accruals are assigned a rank of 10 (1). Next, we extend our model 
in equation (3) by incorporating and interacting decile ranks of different categories of 
accruals ACC (current operating accruals and non-current operating accruals) with 
each of the explanatory variables: 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
      (5) 
where ACCi is the decile ranking based on the absolute values of ΑCC.   
 
Table 3 Panel A reports results regarding the effects of the magnitude of 
current (ΔCO) and non-current (ΔNCO) accruals on the share price anticipation of 
earnings across varying levels of corporate disclosure (DIS).  The coefficient on 
ACC*Xt+1 is positive and significant (0.3018, p-value<0.01) suggesting that current 
accruals contribute in providing timely information on future earnings for firms even 
at a minimum level of corporate disclosure. This evidence is in line with the empirical 
findings documented in Dechow (1994) and the arguments in Pope (2003) regarding 
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the role of accruals in enhancing the predictability of earnings components and firm’s 
short term performance. On the other hand, greater magnitude of current accruals may 
reflect incorporation of unreliable accrual components that are likely to generate over-
optimistic or pessimistic expectations of future earnings (Hirscheifer et al., 2004). To 
the extent that corporate disclosure activities either via good quality accounting 
standards (e.g., U.S. GAAP or IAS) or via complementary voluntary narrative 
information (e.g., management earnings forecasts, investment plans) provide relevant 
input to market participants for making informed trading decisions, the 
overstatements of future earnings expectations in current returns are mitigated. This is 
confirmed by a negative and significant interaction coefficient (-0.0260, p-
value<0.01) on DIS*ACC* Xt+1 and is shown in Figure 1.10  
In addition, results regarding the effects of non current (ΔNC) accruals on 
share price anticipation of earnings for low disclosers suggest that their contribution 
in incorporating information on future earnings into current prices is smaller relative 
to current accruals, as indicated by coefficient on ACC*Xt+1 that is lower in 
magnitude (-0.0970) and in statistical significance (p-value = 0.08) than the 
corresponding coefficient for current accruals (0.3018, p-value<0.01). This result is 
not surprising given the fact that matching and timing is slower and less-pronounced 
for non-current accruals (Guay and Sidhu, 2001). How ever, positive and significant 
coefficient DIS*ACC*Xt+1 (0.0158, p-value=0.04) suggests that better disclosure and 
transparency have a reinforcing effect in unravelling future earnings implications 
arising from non-current current accruals. The interactive effects of varying disclosure 
levels and accruals on share price anticipation of earnings are also evident in Figure 1. 
                                                 
10 Walker and Hussainey(2008) also apply this type of interaction  and interpret the coefficient 
by arguing that when this is positive it implies complementary information and when this is negative, 
substitute information from accruals and disclosure.   
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 We also carry out a similar analysis by fitting the regression (5) separately for 
positive and negative (in absolute values) accruals acknowledging that due to the 
impact of conservatism, negative accruals are likely to provide more timely 
information than positive accruals, especially in the case of non-current accruals. 
Results regarding the effects of negative and positive (current and non current) 
accruals on share price anticipation of earnings are set out in Table 3 Panels B and C 
respectively. The focus is on the results reported in Panel B regarding the effects of 
negative current (ΔCO) and non current (ΔNCO) accruals. The coefficient on 
ACC*Xt+1 for current accruals is positive and statistically significant (0.1760, p-
value<0.01) implying that very negative current accruals signal to market participants 
accelerated recognition of losses by means of short-term conservative accounting that 
will reverse in the future11. Extreme negative current accruals are likely to be related 
to suppressing of current earnings; it appears that market participants are able to “see 
through” such accounting practices (e.g., earnings management) and anticipate their 
future reversal reflected in expected higher future earnings even for firms that score 
low in disclosure. The coefficient on ACC*Xt+1 for non current accruals is negative 
and statistically significant (-0.3119, p-value<0.01). This suggests that very negative 
non current accruals (e.g., asset write-downs, restructuring charges) provide timely 
information regarding losses of future economic benefits resulting in decreases in 
share prices. The effect of negative non current accruals on share price decreases is in 
line with prior findings of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Dechow and Ge (2006). 
 An important note here is that the extreme negative accruals may guide over 
pessimistic future earnings anticipation in current prices. We find evidence that 
increased levels of disclosure mitigate over-pessimistic earnings expectations. This is 
                                                 
11 Expected future reversals of current conservative accounting  in terms of economic loss recognition 
is examined and documented empirically by Dargenidou, McLeay and Raonic (2007). 
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indicated by a positive and significant coefficient on DIS*ACC*Xt+1 (0.0361, p-
value<0.01). Observing the effects of positive current and non current accruals on 
future earnings anticipation, we find that the coefficient ACC*Xt+1 is positive and 
statistically significant for current accruals (0.1775, p-value=0.01) and insignificant 
for non current accruals (0.0806, p-value=0.22). Thus, positive current accruals 
improve stock market ability to anticipate future short-term earnings performance by 
means of resolving timing and matching issues. On the other hand, positive non 
current accruals appear to be less successful in anticipating one year-ahead earnings. 
This is not surprising considering that non current accruals are more relevant and 
useful in resolving matching and timing problems over longer time horizons. This 
evidence is similar to that shown by Guay and Sidhu (2001).   
The study also provides estimated of the share price anticipation of future cash 
flows stemming from current, non-current accruals, disclosure and their respective 
interactions.   
We decompose future earnings Xt+1 into its accrual and cash components and 
we extend equation (5):   
 
 
 
 
 
(6) 
where AXt+1 is the accrual component of future earnings Xt+1 calculated as the 
proportion of future short term accruals in Xt+1 and CFXt+1 is the cash component of 
future earnings calculated as the proportion of cash flow in Xt+1.  The coefficients of 
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our interest here are   DIS*CFXt+1, ACC*CFXt+1 and DIS*ACC*CFXt+1. In Table 4 
we report relevant results.   
We find that much of the results reported in Table 3 Panel A regarding the 
anticipation of future earnings is related to the anticipation of cash flow components 
of future earnings. For example, we find that improved disclosure assists in revealing 
future cash flow estimates as it is documented by a positive and significant coefficient 
on DIS*CFXt+1 (0.1871, p-value<0.01) for current accruals. Also, we find that current 
accruals anticipate one year ahead cash flow components of earnings for firms at 
minimum  levels of corporate disclosure (the coefficient on ACC*CFXt+1 is 0.2721 
with a p-value of 0.00) more successfully than non current accruals (the coefficient on 
ACC*CFXt+1 is -0.0943 with a p-value of 0.08). Again, this result is in line with 
earlier findings suggesting the greater usefulness of current accruals in solving timing 
and matching problems over short term intervals. The effects of the interplay between 
disclosure and current (non current) accruals on share price anticipation of earnings 
documented in Table 3 Panel A appears to be related to anticipation of mostly cash 
flow components of future earnings. For example, coefficient on DIS*ACC*CFXt+1 
for current accruals is -0.0226 with a p-value of 0.00  pointing to the role of disclosure 
in curbing over-optimistic cash flow expectations in current returns. On the other 
hand, coefficient on DIS*ACC*CFXt+1 for non current accruals is 0.0153 with a p-
value of 0.05 suggesting that disclosure can be useful in interpreting implications of 
non current accruals on future earnings cash flow components that would otherwise 
be difficult to unravel. These findings are in line with the arguments presented by 
Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2006) regarding the effects of disclosure on the 
distribution of future cash flow estimates.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 Previous research (Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; 
Hope, Kang, Thomas and  Vasvari, 2008; Ettredge, Kwon, Smith and Zarowin, 2005) 
has shown that disclosure enhances the inclusion of future earnings news in current 
returns. Others have examined the inclusion of future earnings news in current returns 
with respect to financial decisions, accounting numbers and practices (e.g. dividends 
by Hanlon, Myers and Shevlin, 2007 and Walker and Hussainey, 2008; R&D 
expenditures by Oswald and Zarowin, 2007; income smoothing practices by Tucker 
and Zarowin, 2006) The current study contributes by showing that the impact of the 
various characteristics (magnitude, sign, ability of accruals to resolve timing and 
matching issues) of accruals on market participants’ future earnings expectations is 
conditional upon disclosure. More specifically, by clearly differentiating between 
current and non-current accruals and pointing to their ability to resolve timing issues, 
we provide evidence that disclosure has incremental effects which depend on the 
timing and the sign of the accruals but also and more importantly, the information in 
accruals and disclosure interact in order to correct overstated expectations arising 
mostly from the extensive use of current accruals and negative non-current accruals. 
 The findings in this study have implications for the interpretation of a great 
number of accounting research studies which claim that market participants can be 
mislead by (current and non-current) accruals manipulation. The evidence provided 
here shows that this evidence should be interpreted critically upon the level of 
disclosure around these accounting numbers.   
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Table 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Current returns 
Rt 
 
Current earnings 
Xt 
 
Disclosure score 
S&P 
 
|ΔCO|/Average 
Total Assets 
 
|ΔNCO|/Average 
Total Assets 
 
      
Mean -0.1264 0.0311 64.6972 0.0338 0.1172 
Median  -0.1188 0.0440 66.6700 0.0232 0.0695 
Standard deviation 0.3244 0.1045 11.1381 0.0376 0.1494 
Minimum  -0.9320 -0.9530 32.9800 0.0000 0.0001 
Maximum 1.7709 0.4420 88.7800 0.4030 0.9725 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
 Current returns 
Rt 
Current earnings 
Xt 
Disclosure score 
S&P 
|ΔCO|/Average 
Total Assets 
 
 
|ΔNCO|/Average 
Total Assets 
 
 
 
Current returns Rt 1     
Current earnings Xt 0.3285 1    
Disclosure score S&P -0.0147 -0.1256 1   
 |ΔCO|/Average Total Assets -0.0053 -0.0117 -0.1859 1  
|ΔNCO|/Average Total Assets -0.037 -0.1788 0.1309 0.1059 1 
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Notes: Current returns Rt   for year t are buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting three months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings Xt for year t is 
income before extraordinary items-available to common, scaled by market value three months after year t-1 fiscal year end. ΔCO and ΔNCO stand for current operating 
accruals and non-current operating accruals. Disclosure is measured by the S&P rating. Market value (closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) is 
measured three months after year t-1 fiscal year-end.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Effect of disclosure on share price anticipation of earnings and cash flows 
 
Model 1: 
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Model  2: (Decomposition of earnings):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1        Model 2 
   
Xt-1 0.7163 0.00 0.6814 0.00
Xt 1.3482 0.00 1.2454 0.00
Xt+1 0.2077 0.03
AXt+1 0.3425 0.00
CFXt+1 0.1539 0.10
Rt+1 -0.3911 0.00 -0.3385 0.00
DIS 0.0004 0.60 -0.0005 0.60
DIS* Xt-1 -0.0628 0.02 -0.0590 0.03
DIS* Xt -0.1278 0.00 -0.1149 0.00
DIS* Xt+1 0.0766 0.00
DIS*A Xt+1 0.0599 0.00
DIS* CFXt+1 0.0825 0.00
DIS* Rt+1 0.0153 0.00 0.0092 0.05
Intercept  -0.1335 0.03 -0.0459 0.46
 
Number of observations: 683 
Wald chi-square   (p-value): <0.001 
 
 
Notes: Current returns Rt   for year t are buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting three 
months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings Xt for year t is income before extraordinary 
items-available to common, scaled by market value three months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Future 
earnings Xt+1 (Lagged earnings Xt-1) are the income before extraordinary items-available to common for 
the year following (preceding) the current year, scaled by market value three months after year t fiscal 
year end. CFXt+1 and AXt+1  are correspondingly the cash and accrual component of Xt+1. DIS is the 
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decile rank of disclosure, where disclosure is measured by the S&P rating. Market value (closing price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) is measured three months after year t-1 fiscal year-end. 
Future returns Rt+1 are the annual buy-and-hold returns for the year following the current year (starting 
three months after the current fiscal year-end). The model is estimated by feasible generalized least 
squares regression in order to control for the presence heteroskedasticity and observations that belong 
to the same firm. Country effects also are taken into account. The Hadi (1994) procedure has been 
applied  for outliers detection.  
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Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: The effects of the magnitude of (current and non-current) accruals and 
disclosure on the share price anticipation of earnings 
 
ACC 
 
alAssetAverageTot
COΔ
 
alAssetsAverageTot
NCOΔ
 
Xt-1 1.8062 0.00 0.7405 0.21
Xt 2.1028 0.00 0.6932 0.11
Xt+1 -1.2779 0.00 0.9253 0.01
Rt+1 -0.4106 0.00 -0.4873 0.00
DIS 0.0006 0.48 -0.0001 0.87
DIS* Xt-1 -0.1567 0.01 -0.0742 0.33
DIS* Xt -0.2211 0.00 0.0557 0.38
DIS* Xt+1 0.1978 0.00 -0.0485 0.33
DIS* Rt+1 0.0188 0.05 0.0102 0.28
ACC 0.0060 0.04 0.0002 0.94
ACC* Xt-1 -0.1865 0.01 0.0003 1.00
ACC* Xt -0.1449 0.01 0.0795 0.26
ACC* Xt+1 0.3018 0.00 -0.0970 0.08
ACC* Rt+1 0.0017 0.86 0.0242 0.02
DIS*ACC* Xt-1 0.0154 0.12 0.0059 0.61
DIS*ACC* Xt 0.0187 0.03 -0.0202 0.04
DIS*ACC* Xt+1 -0.0260 0.00 0.0158 0.04
DIS*ACC* Rt+1 -0.0005 0.71 0.0002 0.88
Intercept  -0.1509 0.02 -0.1206 0.09
Number of observations: 683 
Wald chi-square   (p-value): <0.001 
 
Notes: Current returns Rt   for year t are buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting three 
months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings Xt for year t is income before extraordinary 
items-available to common, scaled by market value three months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Future 
earnings Xt+1 (Lagged earnings Xt-1) are the income before extraordinary items-available to common for 
the year following (preceding) the current year, scaled by market value three months after year t fiscal 
year end. ACC is the decile rank of either ΔCO or ΔNCO which stand for current operating accruals 
and non-current operating accruals. DIS is the decile rank of disclosure, where disclosure is measured 
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by the S&P rating. Market value (closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) is 
measured three months after year t-1 fiscal year-end. Future returns Rt+1 are the annual buy-and-hold 
returns for the year following the current year (starting three months after the current fiscal year-end). 
The model is estimated by feasible generalized least squares regression in order to control for the 
presence heteroskedasticity and observations that belong to the same firm. Country effects also are 
taken into account. The Hadi (1994) procedure has been applied  for outliers detection.  
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Table 3 
Panel B: The effect of (current and non-current) negative  accruals and 
disclosure on share price anticipations of earnings 
 
 
ACC<0 
 
alAssetAverageTot
COΔ
 
alAssetsAverageTot
NCOΔ
 
Xt-1 1.1990 0.08 0.8615 0.22
Xt 1.8670 0.00 -0.1263 0.64
Xt+1 -0.5477 0.13 2.3141 0.00
Rt+1 -0.4632 0.00 -0.4886 0.00
DIS 0.0014 0.10 0.0023 0.02
DIS* Xt-1 -0.0608 0.61 -0.1006 0.30
DIS* Xt -0.2181 0.01 0.1267 0.00
DIS* Xt+1 0.0768 0.23 -0.1949 0.00
DIS* Rt+1 0.0099 0.49 0.0029 0.74
ACC 0.0135 0.00 0.0001 0.96
ACC* Xt-1 -0.1156 0.22 -0.0276 0.79
ACC* Xt -0.0291 0.69 0.1352 0.01
ACC* Xt+1 0.1760 0.00 -0.3119 0.00
ACC* Rt+1 0.0168 0.19 0.0262 0.00
DIS*ACC* Xt-1 -0.0071 0.66 0.0033 0.81
DIS*ACC* Xt 0.0097 0.41 -0.0274 0.00
DIS*ACC* Xt+1 -0.0068 0.48 0.0361 0.00
DIS*ACC* Rt+1 0.0001 0.95 0.0000 0.98
Intercept  -0.2653 0.00 -0.51561 0.00
Number of obs 330 418
Wald chi-square   (p-value): <0.001 
 
Notes: Current returns Rt   for year t are buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting three 
months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings Xt for year t is income before extraordinary 
items-available to common, scaled by market value three months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Future 
earnings Xt+1 (Lagged earnings Xt-1) are the income before extraordinary items-available to common for 
the year following (preceding) the current year, scaled by market value three months after year t fiscal 
year end. ΔCO and ΔNCO stand for current operating accruals and non-current operating accruals. DIS 
is the decile rank of disclosure, where disclosure is measured by the S&P rating. Market value (closing 
price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) is measured three months after year t-1 fiscal 
year-end. Future returns Rt+1 are the annual buy-and-hold returns for the year following the current year 
(starting three months after the current fiscal year-end). The model is estimated by feasible generalized 
least squares regression in order to control for the presence heteroskedasticity and observations that 
belong to the same firm. Country effects also are taken into account. The Hadi (1994) procedure has 
been applied  for outliers detection.  
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Table 3 
Panel C: The effect of positive (current and non-current) accruals and disclosure 
on share price anticipation of earnings  
 
 
ACC>0 
 
alAssetAverageTot
COΔ
 
alAssetsAverageTot
NCOΔ
 
Xt-1 0.7851 0.23 -1.1430 0.16
Xt 2.3453 0.00 2.8001 0.00
Xt+1 -0.3959 0.33 0.1325 0.77
Rt+1 -0.2234 0.00 -0.4814 0.00
DIS 0.0016 0.10 -0.0023 0.02
DIS* Xt-1 -0.0582 0.48 0.2291 0.06
DIS* Xt -0.2690 0.00 -0.1297 0.37
DIS* Xt+1 0.1325 0.03 -0.0081 0.91
DIS* Rt+1 0.0039 0.64 0.0202 0.05
ACC -0.0041 0.17 -0.0023 0.02
ACC* Xt-1 0.0644 0.53 0.1042 0.41
ACC* Xt -0.2301 0.00 -0.0452 0.74
ACC* Xt+1 0.1775 0.01 0.0806 0.22
ACC* Rt+1 -0.0210 0.04 0.0219 0.08
DIS*ACC* Xt-1 -0.0042 0.75 -0.0133 0.44
DIS*ACC* Xt 0.0260 0.03 -0.0017 0.93
DIS*ACC* Xt+1 -0.0098 0.32 0.0046 0.65
DIS*ACC* Rt+1 0.0005 0.75 0.0004 0.87
Intercept  -0.3103 0.00 -0.0274 0.75
Number of obs 352 265
Wald chi-square   (p-value): <0.001 
 
Notes: Current returns Rt   for year t are buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting three 
months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings Xt for year t is income before extraordinary 
items-available to common, scaled by market value three months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Future 
earnings Xt+1 (Lagged earnings Xt-1) are the income before extraordinary items-available to common for 
the year following (preceding) the current year, scaled by market value three months after year t fiscal 
year end. ACC is the decile rank of either ΔCO or ΔNCO which  stand for current operating accruals 
and non-current operating accruals. DIS is the decile rank of disclosure, where disclosure is measured 
by the S&P rating. Market value (closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) is 
measured three months after year t-1 fiscal year-end. Future returns Rt+1 are the annual buy-and-hold 
returns for the year following the current year (starting three months after the current fiscal year-end). 
The model is estimated by feasible generalized least squares regression in order to control for the 
presence heteroskedasticity and observations that belong to the same firm. Country effects also are 
taken into account. The Hadi (1994) procedure has been applied  for outliers detection.  
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Figure 1 
The effect of accruals and disclosure on share price anticipation of earnings  
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Notes: FERC refers to the future earnings response coefficient. More specifically, it refers to the 
coefficients  a13 ACC*Xt+1  in order to assess information contributed by accruals and to (a13 ACC*Xt+1  
+ a8 DIS*Xt+1  + to a17 ACC*Xt+1 ) in order to assess the information contributed by both accruals and 
disclosure.  If a coefficient is not statistically significant at 10%, then it is assumed to be equals to 0. 
Average disclosure is represented by the fifth decile of disclosure; maximum disclosure by the tenth 
and minimum by the first one. The level of accruals is represented here by the median scaled accruals 
per decile.  
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
××+
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
×+
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
×+
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
+
+
−
+
+
−
+
+
−
+
+
−
1ti,
1ti,
ti,
1ti,
ti,i
1ti,
1ti,
ti,
1ti,
ti,
1ti,
1ti,
ti,
1ti,
i
1ti,
1ti,
ti,
1ti,
ti,
R
X
X
X
ACCDIS  
R
X
X
X
ACC β
R
X
X
X
DIS α
R
X
X
X
 αR γ
 37
Figure 1 
The effect of accruals and disclosure on share price anticipation of earnings  
 
Panel B: Non-current accruals  
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Notes: FERC refers to the future earnings response coefficient. More specifically, it refers to the 
coefficients  a13 ACC*Xt+1  in order to assess information contributed by accruals and to (a13 ACC*Xt+1  
+ a8 DIS*Xt+1  + to a17 ACC*Xt+1 ) in order to assess the information contributed by both accruals and 
disclosure.  If a coefficient is not statistically significant at 10%, then it is assumed to be equals to 0. 
Average disclosure is represented by the fifth decile of disclosure; maximum disclosure by the tenth 
and minimum by the first one. The level of accruals is represented here by the median scaled accruals 
per decile.  
 
 
 
 
 
 38
Table 4 
The effect of current and non-current accruals and disclosure on share price 
anticipation of cash flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACC 
 
alAssetsAverageTot
COΔ
alAssetsAverageTot
NCΔ
 
Xt-1 2.0266 0.00 0.7402 0.22
Xt 1.8294 0.00 0.6926 0.13
AXt+1 -0.7330 0.02 0.9700 0.01
CFXt+1 -1.1927 0.00 0.7939 0.02
Rt+1 -0.3196 0.00 -0.4659 0.00
DIS -0.0008 0.40 -0.0009 0.32
DIS* Xt-1 -0.1858 0.01 -0.0731 0.38
DIS* Xt -0.1878 0.00 0.0555 0.41
DIS* AXt+1 0.1285 0.00 -0.0510 0.31
DIS* CFXt+1 0.1871 0.00 -0.0345 0.50
DIS* Rt+1 0.0065 0.55 0.0068 0.58
ACC 0.0039 0.28 0.0001 0.99
ACC* Xt-1 -0.2200 0.01 -0.0005 1.00
ACC* Xt -0.1244 0.05 0.0660 0.36
ACC*A Xt+1 0.2352 0.00 -0.0852 0.11
ACC*CF*Xt+1 0.2721 0.00 -0.0943 0.08
ACC* Rt+1 -0.0033 0.73 0.0265 0.03
DIS*ACC* Xt-1 0.0200 0.07 0.0069 0.57
DIS*ACC* Xt 0.0167 0.06 -0.0185 0.06
DIS*ACC* AXt+1 -0.0180 0.02 0.0146 0.05
DIS*ACC* CFXt+1 -0.0226 0.00 0.0153 0.05
DIS*ACC* Rt+1 0.0004 0.81 0.0004 0.84
Intercept  -0.0258 0.75 -0.0309 0.67
Number of observations: 683 
Wald chi-square   (p-value): <0.001 
 
Notes: Current returns Rt   for year t are buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting three 
months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings Xt for year t is income before extraordinary 
items-available to common, scaled by market value three months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Future 
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earnings Xt+1 (Lagged earnings Xt-1) are the income before extraordinary items-available to common for 
the year following (preceding) the current year, scaled by market value three months after year t fiscal 
year end. CFXt+1  and AXt+1  are correspondingly the cash and accrual component of Xt+1. ACC is the 
decile rank of either ΔCO or ΔNCO which stand for current operating accruals and non-current 
operating accruals. DIS is the decile rank of disclosure, where disclosure is measured by the S&P 
rating. Market value (closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) is measured three 
months after year t-1 fiscal year-end. Future returns Rt+1 are the annual buy-and-hold returns for the 
year following the current year (starting three months after the current fiscal year-end). The model is 
estimated by feasible generalized least squares regression in order to control for the presence 
heteroskedasticity and observations that belong to the same firm. Country effects also are taken into 
account. The Hadi (1994) procedure has been applied  for outliers detection.  
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